The present paper improves the empirical investigation on the effectiveness of the median voter theorem. Using high quality data, it is possible to directly observe net cash transfers for every individual and to investigate the eects of taxes and transfers on dierent classes. Results suggest to reject or at least question the hypothesis that the middle class plays a special role in the policy determination. Not only its gains from redistribution are negligible, but the link between income and redistribution is lower than for any other class of income. Moreover, the strength of the median voter seems to reduce over time. Finally, more asymmetric societies decrease the amount of redistribution targeted to the middle class, a result in strong contrast to the median voter theorem, since according to it the middle class should have incentives to expropriate richest individuals.
Introduction
The aim of the paper is to update and improve the analysis about the eectiveness of the middle class as a decisive scal policy maker. Even if political economy literature has very often relied on the median voter theorem as the mechanism through which the middle class could inuence the direction of scal policies, 1 the empirical evidence on it is very far from being clearcut.
With respect to previous literature, the paper exploits a higher quality income dataset to investigate the size of redistribution relative to dierent classes of population and which economic and political aspects can inuence it. Using two model specications, referring to several measures of inequality and investigating the whole range of income classes, the paper can assess more accurately the role of the middle class in the process of political decision making.
The topic is relevant under two perspectives: rst, testing the eectiveness of a median voter alike mechanism is interesting per se ; second, it is relevant since this is a widely used tool to explain other political processes, and a rejection of its validity could foster a more deep investigation of the political mechanisms linking inequality and redistribution; third, some interest could be found in the political variables if any that inuence its ecacy.
In spite of its relevance, this topic did not receive much attention, mainly due to the lack of suitable data. In order to link the role of the median voter to the redistribution process, the ideal dataset should include the amount of pre-tax income and redistribution for every individual in the population.
Such data are available only for a small number of countries and are homogenized by the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS, 2009 ), that does not release the micro level dataset for condentiality reasons. These data were exploited by Milanovic (2000) in an innovative paper that suers, however, from some drawbacks that will be discussed in the next section. Previous empirical papers make use of outdated datasets on inequality, that according to Deininger and Squire (1998) contain low quality data. The outcome is that results of these papers are very sensitive to data used and it is dicult to compare the conclusions they reach.
The present paper rstly reviews the empirical literature, by analyzing in detail some inuential paper on the topic (section 2), then it describes the several datasets merged together to implement the empirical investigation (section 3). Section 4 includes both a theoretical description of the models and the results obtained by the data, while section 5 concludes.
1 Among others, Meltzer and Richard (1981) ; Bertola (1993) ; Perotti (1993) ; Alesina and Rodrik (1994) ; Persson and Tabellini (1994) are the most frequently quoted.
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The seminal paper by Downs (1957) applies the Hotelling competition model (Hotelling, 1929) to political economy, stating that under some assumptions the median voter of a distribution is the decisive agent in the democratic process. During the last fty years, many theorists have questioned his results, developing a wide literature on the voting process and its eects on the political mechanisms. However, the median voter theorem remains the most widely used assumption whenever the political process is accounted for explaining an economic issue. In the eld of inequality, redistribution and government expenditure, the seminal paper by Meltzer and Richard (1981) highlights that more unequal countries experience higher public expenditure because of the redistributive preferences of a poorer median voter. A decade later, a group of insightful papers by Bertola (1993) ; Perotti (1993) ; Alesina and Rodrik (1994) ; Persson and Tabellini (1994) focuses on the eects of income inequality to economic growth, keeping the assumption that higher inequality is associated to more redistribution through a median voter alike political mechanism.
Even if the median voter theorem is a kind of benchmark from the theoretical perspective, the empirical evidence referred to it is restricted to a small number of papers that, in addition, are very far from nding a commonly agreed result. The main reason for this limited investigation resides in the lack of suitable data on individual preferences, income inequality and redistribution (Deininger and Squire, 1998) . In order to review this branch of literature, I will refer to four well known papers (Persson and Tabellini, 1994; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994; Perotti, 1996; Milanovic, 2000) that summarize exhaustively all the characteristics, shortcomings, methodologies and results on this topic.
The common feature of these papers is the focus on the eectiveness of the middle class in deciding the level of redistribution. The mechanism investigated is simple: a more unequal income distribution is associated to a poorer median voter, who is able to set a higher amount of redistribution that in turn lowers incentives to investments and, ultimately, reduces economic growth. Even if dealing with the same issue, the papers dier among themselves either for the data sources, usually of low quality according to the denition of Deininger and Squire (1998) , or for the methodologies implemented, and all of them nd at least partially dierent results. Persson and Tabellini (1994) run two sets of regressions, one referred to an unbalanced panel of historical data including nine countries from 1830 to 1985, the other consisting of a cross-section of 56 countries in the postwar period.
Due to the lack of suitable data, only the second model can account, even if indirectly, for the role of the middle class.
2 The model links economic growth 2 I will not consider the sensitivity analysis run on a very small sample, since also the
Empirics of the median voter to income inequality, national income, level of education and the presence of democratic institutions. Inequality is measured as the pretax income of the households in the third quintile of the population, based on data elaborated by Paukert (1973) for a period around 1965. The conclusion of the authors is that since growth should be inversely related to inequality in a democracy, but not necessarily in a dictatorship, sign and signicance of the variables related to democratic institutions conrm the eectiveness of the median voter theorem. However, there are two main shortcomings in this model: on the one side, there is not a measure of redistribution and its role in the link between inequality and growth is not directly tested; on the other side, the model relies on only 49 observations that drop to 20 when splitting the sample between democratic and non-democratic countries. Alesina and Rodrik (1994) test the same result as in Persson and Tabellini (1994) using a dierent inequality variable. The model is substantially the same, since economic growth is assumed to be negatively correlated to income inequality, controlling for national income, primary education and the level of democracy. Opposite to the previous case, inequality is measured by Gini indices referred to both income (from Jain (1975) and Fields (1989) ) and land (from Taylor and Hudson (1972) ) and include a larger cross section of 70 countries, both developed and developing. Results are in contrast to those obtained by Persson and Tabellini (1994) . Indeed, even if the negative relationship between inequality and growth is conrmed, the hypothesis that democracies and nondemocracies dier in the relationship between inequality and growth is rejected [...] rais[ing] some question about the generalizability of Persson and Tabellini's results on this front (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994, p.483-484) . One of the values of this paper is that it exploits a larger dataset, but as a drawback it does not directly focus on the middle class, since it considers only the Gini index as an inequality measure. Finally, analogously to Persson and Tabellini (1994) , it does not include any measure of redistribution.
Two years later, Perotti (1996) analyzed more extensively the link between income inequality, democracy and growth.
Using the same data sources as in Persson and Tabellini (1994) , but a slightly dierent inequality measure, 3 he tests several models, nding results dierent from all the previous papers. The rst model I report is analogous to those analyzed previously, but results are dierent. When linking inequality to growth, analogously to Persson and Tabellini (1994) , the correlation is signicantly negative only in democratic countries. However, analogously to Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , political variables are not statistically signicant. This apparently puzzling result is explained by the fact that, in this sample, democratic authors admit that the degrees of freedom are so few that the results are very tentative.
3 The share of income belonging to the third and fourth quintile, instead of the only third quintile.
Empirics of the median voter countries are also the richest ones and it is not possible to disentangle the two eects. The real novelty of his paper, however, is that it also splits the process in two stages, focusing on the one side on the eects of inequality on redistribution (proxied by the maximum marginal tax rate) and, on the other, on the link between redistribution and growth, in a cross section of 49 countries. Results are unexpected: income inequality is not signicantly correlated to redistribution, and redistribution is positively correlated to growth. Under the perspective of the role of the middle class, however, the former result is insightful, since it goes in an opposite direction with respect to Persson and Tabellini (1994) .
Milanovic (2000) faced a quite puzzling framework: using data on similar countries and with comparable sample size, Persson and Tabellini (1994) , Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Perotti (1996) had found opposite results. The novelty of Milanovic (2000) consists in exploiting the Luxembourg Income Study dataset, that provides the researchers with individual micro-data comparable both across countries and over time. This represents an improvement under three perspectives: rst, the sample size increased up to 79 observations; second, it was possible for the rst time to exploit the panel dimension of the dataset, taking into account the time invariant unobserved heterogeneity; third, it was possible to directly create redistribution measures based on individual data. Opposite to previous literature, therefore, Milanovic (2000) directly tested how the amount of redistribution targeted to the middle class depends on the share of income it earns. Results are in line with those found by Perotti (1996) : not only the middle class is always a net looser in the process of redistribution (namely, taxes levied on the third quintile of the distribution are always higher than the transfers to it), but there are no signicant relationships between its market income and the level of redistribution targeted to it. Opposite, such relationship is eective for poorest classes of population: the amount of net redistribution to the poorest half and the poorest quintile are negatively and strongly signicantly correlated to their market income. Moreover, the level of democracy leaves unaected all the conclusions of the paper.
Despite its innovation, the paper by Milanovic (2000) suers from some inaccuracy. First, the amount of redistribution targeted to the middle class is miscalculated, being the true values lower; 4 second, it includes also a bunch of observations for which LIS does not provide ex-ante income values. It is not possible to assess whether and how this inclusion drives the results, however being the actual sample size larger in the present paper I am able to exclude these observations, obtaining more precise results.
5 Finally, 4 
11
The main merit of the LIS dataset is that it allows to compute both ex-ante and ex-post income at individual level. 11 The detailed list of datasets can be found at http://www.lisproject.org/techdoc/ datasets.htm. 52 of 164 datasets do not include information on gross income, while 8 observations are dropped because of some problem on the variables generation.
12 To be precise, the datasets correctly include household incomes. In order to account for individuals, I standardize the variable by dividing household income for the square root of the components. This is a frequent standardization methodology, since households are supposed to experience scale economies increasing with the household membership.
Francesco Scervini
Empirics of the median voter able income (ex-post ) Gini index (see table 2 ). In turn, this represents an improvement under two perspectives: rst of all, opposite to the papers by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , it is an inequality index genuinely independent from the level of (at least, contemporaneous) redistribution; second, it is possible to directly measure redistribution as the relative change of the Gini indices: the gap between ex-ante and ex-post inequality can be directly and exclusively imputed to scal redistribution.
13
Even if Gini index is a widely used inequality measure, two shortcomings suggest to look for other measures in order to investigate the eectiveness of the middle class in the redistribution process. First, it is not possible to account for re-ranking and to investigate the eects of redistribution at individual level; second, it is not possible to focus on specic classes of individuals. In order to overcome these two issues, I computed a second set of variables: ex-ante and ex-post income of every individual, aggregated by deciles. On the one side, these variables are very eective in determining how dierent classes are dierently aected by redistribution, since they can also account for re-ranking. On the other side, they are not suitable at all to describe the general level of inequality and redistribution. Indeed, this procedure generates 30 variables for every observation, that is ex-ante and ex-post share of total income belonging to every decile and the dierence between these two variables, that is a very precise measure of redistribution.
14
In addition, I also computed some decile ratio, in order to capture some polarization aspect of the income distribution. These variables quantify the relative distance in terms of ex-ante income between some classes of population, namely the rich tail (tenth decile), the middle class (fth and sixth decile) and the poor tail (rst quintile).
Empirical analysis
The present section is devoted to describe the empirical strategy adopted to test the eectiveness of the median voter in redistributive policy setting, given the availability of data analyzed in the previous section. In general, what the following models test is the connection between some inequality index and the relative redistribution measure.
13 Notice that according to many insightful theoretical and empirical papers (among others, Bassett et al. (1999) ; Moene and Wallerstein (2001) ) I do not consider compulsory social contribution and related public transfers as redistribution. Indeed, they must be dened as deferred consumption and do not represent redistribution as a transfer from rich to poor.
14 Such a detailed analysis at deciles level was rstly implemented by Milanovic (2000) .
However, the present analysis improves his work under two perspectives: rst, the sample size is more than doubled, including not only a longer time span, but also a wider number of countries. Second, opposite to Milanovic (2000) , it does not include those datasets for which gross income cannot be computed, making inequality and redistribution measures much more precise.
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With respect to econometric methodology, the issue is subtle. The panel nature of the sample would suggest to implement a time invariant unobserved heterogeneity model following Milanovic (2000) that allows to deal with unobservable institutional and political characteristics of every single country. On the other side, the relative small number of observations and the very unbalanced path of the sample could raise some doubts on the results. The alternative model is an ols, implemented by all the literature prior to Milanovic (2000) . This model disregards at all the panel dimension of the sample by treating the observations as if they originate from dierent countries. Since there are no decisive elements to discriminate between the two strategies, in the following I report results from both the methodologies: dierences are negligible, suggesting that results are robust to dierent models and overcoming the choice between them.
A second issue regards the missing values. By adding the set of controls described above, the number of observations reduces to 79 countries. In order to test whether results are somehow driven by observations dropped due to some missing value, I run analogous regressions considering only inequality and redistribution measures from the complete sample of LIS data. Also in this case, there are no signicant dierences in the relationship between the two relevant dimensions.
Estimation strategy
The models tested in the paper can be generically summarized by the following:
where R is a measure of redistribution, I is an inequality index, C is a set of economic and political controls, T are seven time dummies, considering periods after 1973.
15 The former equation includes also a time invariant heterogeneity term (u i ), while the latter is the pooled-ols formulation. In the following I consider several specications of the general model above, each one focusing on a dierent aspect of the problem. The rst relates overall inequality and overall redistribution, disregarding the middle class.
Opposite to Persson and Tabellini (1994) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994) , the present model includes a measure for redistribution, that is the relative 15 Because of the small number of observations, many yearly dummies would have a too low variability, or even be constant. The sign of these dummies would not be driven by the genuine time eect, but by some unobserved feature of the countries that happened to be observed in that specic year. By aggregating time dummies in seven periods (1973-1977 to 2003-2007) it is possible to consider the time eects without generating such meaningless variables.
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Empirics of the median voter change of Gini index after the scal transfers, 16 and it can directly investigate the nexus between inequality and redistribution:
The expected sign for β is positive, as suggested by virtually all literature.
The second set of models aims at testing the role of the median voter in the redistributive process. Analogously to Persson and Tabellini (1994) , the dependent variable is the amount of net transfers received by the middle class; opposite to it, the regressor is the amount of market income earned by the middle class, as introduced by Milanovic (2000) . According to the median voter theorem, the expected sign is negative, suggesting that a poorer median voter should receive a higher amount of transfers or pay a lower amount of taxes. In addition to the middle class, I tested the same relationship also for other classes of income: according to Milanovic (2000) , I focus on the poorest half of the population and on the poorest quintile, in order to compare the redistributive propensity of policy makers to classes dierent from the median voter. For the same comparative reasons, I run the same regressions also for every decile in the population. The models can be all summarized as:
where d is referred to several classes of population: every decile from 1 to 10, the rst quintile (called very poor from now on), the st half of the population (poor) and the third quintile (middle class, or median voter).
The third class of models aims at testing asymmetry of political power as a consequence of asymmetry of income distribution. The link between the two asymmetries is treated by several papers, either as an assumption (see for instance Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) or as a result of a political-economic process Scervini (2009) 
where an asymmetry term is added in the regressions and d is either the middle or the poorest quintile of the population.
Results
This section is devoted to present and comment the results of regressions.
In the following I refer to models described in the previous sections, while Empirics of the median voter in the literature is Milanovic (2000) , that gets to opposite conclusions: in that paper coecients are higher in absolute value, but the model is not signicant, leading the author to conclude that the middle classes' gain or loss in redistribution is independent of the initial factor distribution. This is explained by the fact that middle classes receive little in the form of nonpension cash transfers such as unemployment benets, social assistance and even family allowances. Thus, the median voter hypothesis fails when we focus on the truly redistributive transfers only. (Milanovic, 2000, p. 394) .
Results from the improved dataset I use in this paper lead to opposite results:
even if the eect is weaker, the amount of market income is signicant in explaining the level of cash redistribution to the middle class, both with ols and fe models, both with and without controls. Moreover, time trends
show a clear and steady reduction in the level of redistribution to the median voter. Opposite to the conclusions by Persson and Tabellini (1994) , the dummy democracy is never signicant and there is no dierence between the whole sample and the group of democratic countries. On the one side, the pure eect of income on redistribution supports the existence of a median voter theorem eect, since poorer middle classes receive more cash transfers.
However, democracy eects are never signicant while, according to the theory, there should be some eect, since the median voter theorem should apply only in democracies , the time trend is signicant suggesting a kind of declining power of the middle class and the net transfers to the middle class is negative in 16 cases over 104, meaning that the median voter is a net looser from redistribution process in almost 15% of the cases. Moreover, the average gain of the middle class is .59% of total income and 3.86% of their market income. The same gures for the poorest half of the population are 6.49% and 32.21%.
In order to investigate if and how middle class is dierent with respect to other classes, I focus on the poorest tail of the population (tables 7 to 10).
Results are much more similar to those by Milanovic (2000) : coecient are negatively signicant 17 both for the poorest half of the population and for the poorest quintile, with coecients higher (in absolute values) than those relative to the middle class. Opposite to the middle class, however, there are no time trends and the importance of unemployment rate is intuitively increasing for poorer classes, since unemployed are very likely to belong to low (pre-transfers) income groups and to receive some cash redistribution.
Comparing results from the three dierent classes of population, we nd that the relationship between income and redistribution is much stronger for poorest classes of income than for the median voter. Moreover, while 17 The only exception is the xed eect model with controls for the poorest half. In the case, however, neither the F test is signicant, meaning that the whole model should be considered as meaningless. Since all other specications are signicant and coherent with both previous results and literature, I ascribe the non signicance of that model to the reasons why I implement also ols regressions. between democratic and non democratic countries, and democracy dummy is never signicant. Therefore, the arguments that could lead us to support the eectiveness of the median voter theorem apply also for classes of income dierent from the middle one. Figure 1 shows the coecients (in absolute value) of the regressions linking market income of every single decile of population to the associated amount of redistribution. What emerges is that the eects of income on redistribution are kind of u-shaped, being very strong for the poorest individuals and increasing from the fth to the ninth decile. The most unexpected result is that the weaker eect is exactly in correspondence of the middle class, between fourth and sixth deciles. This result is really puzzling in the perspective of the median voter theories: the class that benets the less from a reduction of income is the middle one. Opposite, expected results are for the two tails of the distribution. Poorest ones receive an amount of transfers much higher than the others, richest decile an amount signicantly lower than closest ones. The puzzling result is that middle class coecients are very similar, or even lower, than those associated to the top decile.
The last class of models I test in the paper refers to the level of income asymmetry, in order to shed some light on the possible reason why the eectiveness of the median voter is not conrmed by empirical estimates.
Income polarization can foster two phenomena: on the one side, it amplies Results are again in strong contrast to the predictions of the median voter theorem. Indeed, the eect of the distance between rich and middle classes on redistribution targeted to the latter is negative, meaning that xed the share of income the further the median voter from the richest individuals, the lower redistribution she gets. This result is very dicult to be explained in a classical median voter theorem, but much easier to reconcile under the perspective of asymmetry of political power: whatever the reason, richest individuals hold more power relative to other classes and therefore they can set a tax scheme more targeted on their own interests. The wider is the distance between them and the middle class, the more dierent are their preferences, the less redistribution the middle class receives.
A similar argument seems not to apply for the poorest individuals in the population. In this case, the distance between the two tails of the population is not signicant in explaining the amount of redistribution the poorest individuals receive. Opposite to the previous case, this can be explained by referring to several models: rst, Galor and Zeira (1993) and Saint-Paul and Verdier (1993) give some incentives to rich individuals to redistribute in favor of the poorest in order to make the whole economy grow faster; second, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) state that richest classes could implement some redistribution in order to avoid threatens of revolutions and social conicts;
third, there could be ethic reasons driving redistributive choices in favor of the very low income individuals. However, what is relevant for the paper is that once again the median voter seems not to play any special role in the redistribution setting.
18 Models that refer to the middle class as a decisive agent in the political process predict that the richer are richest classes with respect to the middle class, the stronger are the incentives for it to expropriate the very rich individuals through a tax scheme very biases in their favor.
Conclusions
The paper carries on the existing research that investigates the role of the median voter in the redistribution process. With respect to previous literature, it exploits a larger high quality dataset to test models including the proper variables (market and disposable income shares and Gini indices, detailed redistribution measures, deciles and quintiles ratios) and a set of political and economic controls.
Results are twofold: on the one side, the paper conrms the positive relation between inequality and redistribution. On the other side focusing on the role of the median voter there are several reasons that lead us to reject or at least question its role in the redistributive decision process.
First, the amount of cash transfers she receives decreased steadily over time, while poorer classes did not experience a similar trend. Second, the level of democracy is not signicant in explaining the amount of redistribution and there are no relevant dierences if we consider only the subsample of democratic countries. Third, the quantitative eect of income on redistribution relative to the middle class is not only lower than that referred to the poorer individuals, but also to the richer ones. Indeed, the lowest coecients are for middle deciles (fourth to sixth). Fourth, the further the middle class from the richest tail, the less redistribution it gets, opposite to the incentives to redistribution or expropriation that the middle class is expected to practise.
Summarizing, if one is ready to assume that a negative relation between inequality and redistribution is a sucient evidence in support of the median voter theorem, then the former is conrmed. However, if one analyzes more in detail the characteristics of the middle class and its dierence with respect to the rest of the population, the role of the median voter is much more questionable. Even if some results could give evidence of an inuent role of the middle class, many others go in the opposite direction, suggesting that mechanisms dierent from those envisaged by the median voter theorem are eective in explaining the amount of redistribution and its recipients.
Even if this paper represents an improvement with respect to the previous empirical literature, a lot of issues remain opened and would require further investigations. A very relevant one regards non-cash redistribution.
It is possible that redistribution takes the form of in-kind public provision (see for instance Epple and Romano (1996) ). In this case, the amount of redistribution is underestimated not only in the present paper, but by virtually all the cross country comparisons. Indeed, if it is possible to account for in-kind redistribution for single countries case studies, it is a very hard task to compare how dierent classes of income in dierent countries are aected by dierent in-kind redistributive schemes. A second issue refers to the low sample size. The quality of LIS data is much higher than any other dataset, but unfortunately only a relatively small number of countries participate to 
